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ii.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondents are the owners of certain building lots
located in Roosevelt City, which were conveyed by the
appellants.

Respondents claim that appellants breached

their covenant against encumbrances by their failure to
pay the assessments for curb, gutter, and paving improvements levied by Roosevelt City.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court held that the creation and functioning of Roosevelt Special Improvement District No. 1 in
April of 1974 established an encumbrance on the property,
even though said encumbrance was two years prior to the
earliest date that the Special Improvement District could
levy an assessment under §§10-16-12 and 10-16-23, Utah Code
Ann., 1953 as amended.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Amicus Curiae, Title Insurance Company of Minnesota
seeks to have the Judgment of the District Court reversed
and the provisions of the Municipal Special Improvement
District Act established as the sole procedure whereby
property within a Special Improvement District may be encumbered.
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STATEHENT OF FACTS
Amicus Curiae agrees with the statement of facts as
it is presented in the Appellants' Brief.
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S HOLDING IS CONTRARY TO STATUTE

In 1969, the Utah State Legislature passed the Municipal Improvement District Act, hereinafter "Act", with the
following stated purpose:
... to rev::.se, codify and improve existing
laws relating to Municipal Special Improvement Districts, to recognize existing practices relating to such districts and to
modernize and improve such laws in light of
such practice ... §10-16-2, Utah Code Ann.,
1953, as amended.
Part of the clarification provided by the Act is the specific
procedure to be followed by muncipalities to encumber real
property in order to pay for improvements.

Since the statute

establishes a given procedure for placing ar, encumbrance or
lien against property

w~thin

the District, it is inaporopriate

for the trial court to hold in direct opposition to the statute.
One of the most important parts of the Act, and one of
the points of greatest concern because of the likelihood of
potential litigation,

is the procedure whereby money may be

collected to finance improvements made by a District.

The

legislature, in an attempt to give the maximum guidance to
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the municipalities, specifically enumerated the events which
must occur before a District may lev; an assessment. Section
10-16-12, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended, provides three
alternative times when a municipality may levy:
WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED - Assessments
for improvements in a Special Improvement
District may be levied:
(1) At any time after all contracts
for the making of the improvements have
been let, the property price for all
property acquired to make the improvements has been finallv determined and
the reasonable cost of any work to be
done by the municipality has been determined; or
(2)
For light service or park maintenance, at any time after the light
service or park maintenance has commenced; or
(3) At any time after all of the improvements in the Special Improvement
District are entirely completed and
accepted.
/
After listing these three alternatives when the municipality
I

may levy, the legislature explained the consequences of levying an assessment in §10-16-23, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as
amended:
ASSESSMENT CONSTITUTES LIEN AGAINST PROPERTY -PRIORITY -An assessment, any interest
accruing on the assessment and the cost
of the assessment shall constitute a lien
on and against the property upon which the
assessme~t is levied on the effective
date of the ordinance levying the
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assessment, •.-Jhich lien shall be superior
to the lien of any trust deed, mortgage,
mechanic's or materialman's lien, or other
encumbrance and shall be equal to and on
a parity with the lien for general property
taxes. Such lien shall continue until the
assessment and any interest on the assessment is paid notwithstanding any sale of
the property for or on account of a general
property tax, special tax, other assessment
or the issuance of an auditor's deed.
(emphasis added)
The Special Improvement District does not have any
monetarv cc:ntrol over the property until an assessment has
been levied.

Prior to the levy there is no way for the

District to effect the property right of an owner whose
property is located within the District.
In the instant case, the ordinance levying the assessment was adopted subsequent to the conveyance of the real
property by the appellants.

It is also significant to note

that the conveyance took place before any of the three alternative events authorized by H0-16-12 Utah Code Ann.,
1953, as amended, had occurred.
The trial court in its fifth conclusion of law held in
direct opposition to the aforementioned statute:
5. That by reason of said Special Improvement District existing and functioning at
the time the defendants conveyed to each
of the plaintiffs or their predecessors in
interest, defendants breached their covenant
against encumbrances as provided for in
§57-l-12, not withscanding the provisions
of §10-16-23.
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In an attempt to support the holding of the Court, which
is in direct opposition to the statute, the respondents
employ two lines of argument.

The first line attempts to

distinguish an encumbrance from a lien and thereby circumvent §10-16-23.

The second line cites cases from other

jurisdictions which allegedly support the trial court.
The respondents fail in their first attempt because they
cannot establish that there was either an encumbrance or
a lien on the property at the time of the conveyance.

They

fail in their second attempt because the cases from other
jurisdictions are either inapposite or they are from jurisdictions that do not have a statute like the Utah Municipal
Improvement District Act.
In analyzing the respondents' first line of reasoning,
it is necessary to ask, "How does the existence and functioning of a Special Improvement District encumber the property?"
The respondents admit there was no lien, but say there was
an encumbrance.

The definition of an encumbrance used by

respondents in their argument undermines rather than sustains
their point.

The respondents quote from Black's Law Dictionary,

revised fourth edition, which defines encumbrances as:
Any right to or interest in, land which
may subsist in another to the diminution
of its value, but consistent with the
passing of fee. (Respondents' Brief, p. 4)
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There is no evidence to show that the existence of
the District caused a diminution in value of the property,
and, if it did not lessen the value of the property, it has
not encumbered the property according to respondents' definition.
In fact, according to respondents' definition, the

creation of a District no doubt significantly increased the
value of land.
paved road

~s

Property improved with curb, gutter and a
more valuable to the respondents than the same

property without these improvements.

This increase in value

because of the improvements would more than offset the monetary burden placed on the property to pay for the improvements.

That monetary burden could only be effective after

an assessment had been levied pursuant to §10-16-23.
In answer to the respondents' second line of reasoning,
the cases which the respondents cite are either inapposite
or distinguishable.

In Clark v. Fisher, 54 Kan. 408, 38 P 493

(cited at page 5 of Respondents' Brief), the Kansas Court
concerns itself with the enforcement of a lease provision
which survives the sale of the real property.

The provision

was a part of the agreement between the parties and did not
constitute a lien which the buyer had to pay.

In the instant

case there is a specific finding that there was no meeting of
the minds concerning payment for the improvements (Finding of
Factll).
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In O'Shay v. Chandoir, 104 So. 59(Ky) the Court held
that the "vendee contracted to purchase a lot of ground
on a paved street."
on contract.

The Kentucky Court's holding was based

The Court held that the vendee should get what

he bargained for and what the vendor said he had to convey.
In the instant case there was no meeting of the minds regarding who would pay for the improvements and no evidence
on the question of who would pay the assessment and how that
would affect the purchase of the lot.
Respondents then cite two Massachusetts cases, Cotting
v. Commonwealth, 205 Mass. 423, 91 N.E. 900, and Engel v.
Thompson, 146 N.E. 2nd 657 (Mass.), and claim they constitute
the majority rule.

Massachusetts does not have a statute

equivalent to Utah's Municipal Improvement District Act, therefore the Massachusetts cases and the rule they represent are
not relevant.

The legislature has decided what the policy

should be in the State of Utah.

It has mandated to municipali-

ties when an assessment may be levied (§10-16-12) and the
effect of the levy (§10-16-23).

Courts without such a clear

statutory injunction may be persuaded that property is encumbered before an assessment is levied.

However, the Utah law

is clear on the events which must occur before a Special
Improvement District may encumber real property located within the District.
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POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WENT BEYOND THE
PLEADINGS.
The plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment
was based on the theory that the defendants had agreed to
pay for curb, gutter and paving improvements and their
failure to so pay was a breach of the covenant against
encumbrances in the warranty deeds.

The plaintiffs' prayer

was that the defendants be required to fulfill their verbal agreement and pay for the improvements.

The evidence

introduced by the plaintiffs was also based on this theory.
Although the trial court found that the defendants had
not represented, promised or agreed to pay for such improvements, the court went beyond the pleadings and held that the
property had been encumbered since April 1974 when the Roosevelt Special Improvement District had been created.

Thus,

the trial court's holding was based on a theory neither contained in the pleading nor directly addressed by either the
plaintiffs or the defendants.
Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
When issues not raised by the pleadings
are tried by express or imply consent of
the parties, they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in
the pleadings.

-8- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The purpose of an amendment to conform to the proof is to
bring the pleadings in line with the actual issues upon
which the case is tried.

However, the rule does not cover

a situation like the one in the present case.

Such an im-

plied amendment of the pleadings should only be allowed when
it is not prejudicial to either party.
In determining whether or not there has been an implied
amendment to the pleadings 3 Moore's Federal Practice, para.
15.13, page 847 states:
The test should be whether the defendant
would be prejudiced by the implied amendment, i.e., whether he had a fair opportunity to defend and whether he could
offer any additional evidence if the case
were to be retried on a different theory.
In this case the defendants were prejudiced by the court's
holding being based on a theory not contained in the pleadings.

If the case were to be retried on the theory that the

mere creation and functioning of the Special Improvement
District created an encumbrance on real property within the
District, the defendants could present the Resolution itself
as evidence.
The trial court did not have before it a copy of the
Resolution creating a Special Improvement District.

If the

case were retried, the court would have the language of the
Resolution and be able to determine the intent of Roosevelt
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City.

This additional evidence could have been introduced

at the trial court by the defendants and have been a significant aid to the Judge in making a decision with regard to
the Resolution,
The court erred in going beyond the pleadings.

There

was no implied consent on behalf of the defendants to allow
the pleadings to be treated as if they raised the issue of
the encumbrance attaching as of the creation and functioning
of the Special Jis:rict.

The plaintiffs should not be able

to recover where the evidence establishes a wholly different
case from that which they alleged, and where the defendants
have been misled and prejudiced thereby.

See, Mile v.

California Growers Wineries, 114 P.2d 651 (Ca. 1941); Reilly
v. Maw, 405 P.2d. 440 0'1ont. 1965).
POINT III: THE CREATION OF A SPECIAL IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT
DID NOT CONSITUTE A PRESENT ENCUMBRANCE OF THE PROPERTY.
The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District Court
in and for Duchesne County, State of Utah, held in its second
conclusion of law:
"That the creation and functioning of
the Roosevelt City Special Improvement
District No. 1 from and after April,
1974, created an encumbrance on the
subject properties, notwithstanding
that the Ordinance assessing the lien
had not been adopted.
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In order to determine whether the court erred in the aforementioned conclusion of law, it is necessary to examine the
Resolution itself.

If the Resolution merely created the

possibility of an encumbrance,then there would be no breach
of the covenant against encumbrances in the warranty deeds
from the defendants to the plaintiffs and the defendants would
not be liable for the assessment on the respective properties.
Section 2 of the Resolution provides:
... that the City could, at any time
hereafter, exclude any portion of
the City from the District. (Appendix
A, Appellants' Brief).
This reservation within the Resolution itself negates the
possibility that all property was immediately encumbered.
The properties to be assessed under the Resolution were not
determined by the Resolution itself since it provided that
some parts of the City may be excluded from the District.
The assertion of future intent to assess some properties and
levy on them is not the equivalent of a present encumbrance,
nor could it have established present liability to an eventual
lien on all properties in Roosevelt City.
Another section of the Resolution is also essential in
determining whether or not it created a present encumbrance.
Section 4 provides in part:
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... that the City is hereby authorized
cours~ to levy assessments upon
~escribeain the Notice of
Inn~-fic~on to pay for--the -i!i1pTOVements
to 15e made, and- the City officials of
said City are hereby directed to proceed
to construct the said improvements.
in~ue

Again the intent of the Resolution is discernible on its
face.

The City was authorized in due course to levy assess-

ments.

The statutory authority granted by the Resolution is

permissive rather than mandatory.

It relates to the future

and indicates that the property will be encumbered "in due
course" rather than relating to the present and to an innnediate encumbrance.
The language of the Resolution itself coincides with
the procedure set up by the Utah State Legislature for establishing a lien for municipal improvements, Section 10-16-23,
Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended.

The "in due course" lan-

guage would be equivalent to the statute which indicates the
property would be encumbered" ... on the effective date of the
ordinance levying the assessments ... "
In a recent Maryland decision, Strass et al v. DistrictRealty Title Insurance Corporation, 31 Md. App 690, 353A. 2nd
(1976), the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland had to determine when assessments levied by the City of Rockville for the
construction of water and sewer lines became liens or encumbrances on real property,

This case had a similar factual
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situation to the instant case except that the suit was
on the covenant against encumbrances in the Title Insurance policy rather than the covenant
in a warranty deed.

a~ainst

encumbrances

The Court of Special Appeals held

that the assessments were not encumbrances until they were
inevitable and that as long as the City had the option to
levy them or not, they were not inevitable.

In the Strass

case the court determined that a close look at the Ordinance
granting the City Authority to assess liens was essential.
Since the language of the Ordinance was permissive rather
than mandatory. the court held that the property was not
encumbered until the assessment was inevitable and the
assessment was not inevitable until the date that it was
levide.
The language of the Resolution passed by Roosevelt
City in the instant case was permissive in the same way that
the Ordinance of the City of Rockville was permissive in the
Strass case.

The decision of the Maryland court was based

on strict statutory interpretation.

A close look at the

wording of the Resolution of Roosevelt City itself demonstrates
that it Has in fact permissive and not mandatory and the
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Duchesne County, State
of Utah, erred in holding that the properties involved were
immediately encumbered on the passage of the Resolution.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT IV: UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT WOULD UNDERMINE THE
MUNICIPAL IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT ACT &~ ADVERSELY EFFECT
THE CONVEYANCE OF REAL PROPERTY.
In an area of law as fraught with the possibility of
litigation as the conveyance of real property, statutes and
decisional law should promote clarity and lessen the need
for litigation,

If the law defines the parameters rNithin

which people can convey real property and determine who
will be responsible for certain payments at the time of conveyance, there will be less litigation.

In the instant case,

if the trial court's holding were to be sustained, it would
establish a second method for a Special Improvement District
to encumber real property.

Property would become encumbered

on the creation of the Special Improvement District, although
the amount of the encumbrance would be unknown.

Rather than

clarifying the law, this decision undermines the statutory
procedure for encumbering real property under the Municipal
Improvement District Act and significantly interferes with
the conveyance of real property.
The superiority of the statutory position is obvious.
It establishes a date certain for the creation of a lien and

an amount certain.

If anyone is interested in finding out

whether or not certain property is encumbered by a lien and
the amount of that lien, they can check the County Recorder's
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Office.

Any purchaser of real property can have the title

to the property searched to determine if there are any
special assessments and any assessment can be paid at the
time of purchase.
If the trial court were to be sustained, purchasers and
sellers would not be certain of their positions as of the
date of conveyance.

When two and one-half years pass be-

tween the creation of a Special Improvement District and the
levy of the assessment, as in this case, real estate closings
may not become final for two and one-half years or more.

If

a closing is handled by a realtor or title insurance company,
money, in an undetermined amount, would have to be held in
escrow awaiting the time when the assessment would be levied.
It is almost certain to create litigation in sales handled
by the owner himself.

The existence of a Special Improvement

District would probably remain unknown until the assessment
is levied,
The trial court's decision, if upheld, would also have
a detrimental effect on the issuance of title insurance within the state.

Until a Special Improvement District assessment

is levied,it is not of record and will not be revealed by a
title search.

At the present time title insurers are charged

with knowledge of record title and must insure against any and
all encumbrances of record.

Under the trial court's holding
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title insurance companies would be forced to keep a record
of the actions of every municipality and every district
with authority to levy an assessment against real property.
A list of the types of districts with authority to levy
against real property appears at page 16 and 17 of Appellants'
Brief.
Respondents have argued in their reply to Title Insurance Company of Minnesota's Motion for Leave to File Brief,
that title insurance companies should except this possible
encumbrance from the coverage of their policies.

If respon-

dents' reasoning were followec,insurance companies would
make exceptions for anything which might create a risk and
thereby would defeat the purpose of insurance.

A better rea-

soned approach would be to sustain the procedure outlined in
the Municipal Special Improvement District Act for establishing a lien on real property.

This procedure removes uncer-

tainty and reinforces the certainty that a title search of
the record title will accurately reflect the status of title
at the time of closing.
Another untenable situation would exist with respect to
land which is ostensibly within a newly created Special Improvement District wherein the Resolution creating the District
contains a reservation similar to the one in the instant case:
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... that the City could at any time
hereafter, exclude any portion of
the City from the District.
(Appendix A, Appellants' Brief)
It would be unjust to deprive an owner of part of the selling price for a two and one-half year period on the mere
possibility that there may be an assessment on property
he has sold which may or may not be within the boundaries
of the Special Improvement District.

There would also be

frequent disagreements as to the amount escrowed, the purchaser wanting a higher amount than the seller.

As there is

no formula for arriving at a just figure to cover assessments
to be levied in the future, the possibility for difficulties
at a closing would be increased.
A seller of real property would also be disadvantaged in
setting a price on a presently unimproved lot which is located within a Special Improvement District.

He would be in

the position of trying to raise his asking price commensurate
with monies he would be required to pay in the future when
the assessment is finally levied.
The statutory procedure established by the State Legislature is also superior in that the party who gets the benefit
of the improvements also has the burden of paying for them.
Under the Municipal Improvement District Act the reasonable
cost of the work to be done has to be determined or the
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improvement has to be made before the assessment can be
levied.

Consequently, the person who has possession when

the assessment is levied either has the benefit of the improvements for his own use, or, if he wishes to sell, he
·has the benefit of the improvements to increase the fair
market value of the property.
If the trial court were sustained, an owner who gets no
benefit from the improvements personally would have the
burden of paying for them.

Even if he were to advertise

that the lot was within a Special Improvement District and
that at some future time would have curb, gutter and paving,
he could not guarantee how many years it would be before
said improvements would be made.

He could not ask

the same

price as if the improvements. had already been installed.
Respondents argue that their rights are rights founded
in warranty and not in fairness.

They argue that the coven-

ant against encumbrances in a warranty deed mandated by
§57-l-12, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended, covers this situation.

It is important to note that the covenant in a warranty

deed is a covenant in praesenti.

The covenant against encum-

brances says there are no liens or encumbrances on the date
of conveyance.
liens.

The warranty does not cover all potential future

It is broken, if at all, at the time of conveyance.
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Since tl1e legislature has provided that a lien for the
Irnprovement S·istrict, as tJrovided by the Act, is created
only at the time of assessment, it is a future lien, which
is not covered by the warranties in

the deeds.

wnen the legislature has enacted a detailed method
for encumbering real property within a Special lmprovement District, and that me.thod provides for certainty bet~Yeen

a buyer and a seller as to the date that the encum-

brance comes into

ef~ect

and the amount of that encumbrance,

it would be unwise to cloud that procedure by establishing
a second means for encumbering real property located within
such a district.

The decision of the trial court in this case,

if swstair-ed, would have an unfortunate effect on the conveyance of real property within the State of Utah.

CONCLUSION
The Municipal Special Improvement District Act was
passed by the Utah State Legislature with the intent to
clarify and modernize procedures followed by such districts.
The Act provides a specific procedure for encumbering real
property located within the District.

This procedure is

definite in stating when a District may assess property
within it, and it is definite in stating how the assessment
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may be levied.

The trial court acknowledged the procedure

outlined by the Act but decided that in this case the property was encumbered upon the creation and functioning of the
Roosevelt Special Improvement District No. l.
Amicus Curiae, Title Insurance Company of Minnesota,
submits that the trial court should be reversed because its
holding is contrary to statute.

Further, the decision of

the trial court obscures rather than clarifies the respective
rights of parties involved in the conveyance of property
situated within Special Improvement Districts.

Amicus Curiae

would also urge the Court to recognize §§10-16-12 and 10-16-23
Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended, as the sole method for encumbering real property located within Special Improvement
Districts in the State of Utah.
Respectfully submitted,
BACKMAN, CLARK & ~RSH

cott W. Cameron
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Title Insurance Company of
Minnesota
61 South Main Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411:
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